March, i928.

RECENT CASES
CARRIERS-LOGGING

Tows-CONSTITUTION ALITY

OF REGULATION-A

state

statute1 declared that any towboat operating for a public use is a common
carrier, and as such is subject to rate regulation by a state department. The
relator was engaged in logging operations and required the services of loggingtows. It contended that the statute is unconstitutional in so far as it regulates the rates of logging towboats, the owners of which profess to serve the
public. Held, that logging towboats were included in the statute, and that the
statute so construed was constitutional. State of Washington ex rel. Stimson
Lumber Co. v. Kuykendall, 48 Sup. Ct 416 (1927).
The opinion reveals a confusion in the employment of terms of hitherto
well determined content. The initial confusion arises from the use of the
words "common carrier" in the statute. It is elementary that there are duties
and liabilities peculiar to common carriers which do not attach to other callThe statute does not purport
ings, even though they be on a public basis
to impose any of these duties or liabilities on'the towboat owners, and the
court concedes that they would not be held to the strict liability of common
carriers,' and disavows any intention to change the common law conception of
The conclusion reached, that there was no constitutional
common carriage
objection to the regulation of the business in question is undoubtedly sound,
though for such purpose it is unnecessary to classify it as a common carrier.
Under common law theory log-towing may be a public service and as such
subject to regulation.' The fact that the towboat is engaged in transportation,
a business closely analogous to carriage, and the fact that it makes use of
'WASH. ComP. STAT. (Remington, 1922)
'WYMAN, PUBLIC SERVICE CORPOR.ATIONS

§ 10344 et seq.
(1911) § i9o; GREEN,

CASES ON

(2d ed. 1927) passim.
'The court cited for this proposition The Steamer Webb, 14 Wall. 4o6,
414 (U. S. 1871) ; The Margaret, 94 U. S.494, 496 (876) ; Transportation
Line v. Hope, 95 U. S.297, 300 (1877). Carriage involves the furnishing of
motive power (Mann v. White River Log & Booming Co., 46 Mich. 38, 8 N. W.
550 [I881]), together with a control over the res transported (The Neaffie,
I Abb. 465 [C. C. La. 1870]). The cases on towboats as common carriers are
not all in accord. The important factor seems to be the measure of control
contemplated by the terms of the contract. See WYMAN, op. cit. supra,note
2, at § 173, GREEN, op. cit. tpra;note 2, at 27, n.; HUTcHIxSoN, CARRIERS (3d
ed. 19o6) § 92, n. 27.
"The language of the court is not clear: "They are common carriers not
because of legislative fiat, but by reason of the character of the business they
carry on . . . The rule that towboats not having exclusive control of vessels
towed are not held to the strict liability of common carriers [citing cases supra
CARRIERs

note 3] does not affect the question under consideration . . . Its towboat
was devoted to the public use . . . By its own choice, it became a common

carrier . . . The State had power to regulate its charges. Munn v. Illinois,
94 U. S. 113." Does this not mean they can be regulated under the name
of common carriers even though they are not common carriers?
'See WYMAN, op. cit. supra note 2, at I5O, and cases there cited.
(605)
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the public waterway are factors which tend to prove it a public service.8 But
whether it be a public servant or not (which problem would come up if there
were a refusal to serve some member of the public which it professed to
serve) the business may still be regulated if it be one affected with a public
interest." Under this classification the constitutionality of legislation has been
sustained with regard to the regulation of the business of insurance,' carrying
oil by pipe line,9 distributing ice, 0 cold storage warehousing,' selling of coal,'
renting of dwellings,' and other businesses. As an additional example of
regulation," the. decision does not throw any significant light on the Supreme
Court's attitude in the field of governmental price control.
CONSTITUTIONAL
EIGN JUDGMENT

LAw--FuLL

FAITH AND

CREDIT-RECOGNITION

RENDERED UPON LAPSED DOmEsTIc JUDGMENT-A

OF FOR-

Washing-

ton statute provided that judgments should lapse six years after rendition, and
that no suit should be had by which the six-year period would be extended.'
A. the assignee of a judgment rendered against B in Washington, commenced
suit on the Washington judgment in Oregon by personal service less than six
years after the rendition of the Washington judgment. B, failing to complete
his pleadings in the Oregon action, had judgment entered against him there
more than six years after rendition of the Washington judgment. In a third
suit, in Washington, on the Oregon judgment, B successfully pleaded the
Washington statute as a defense
Held, on appeal, that under the full faith
and credit clause of the United States Constitution, the admission of the plea
6

Cf. Mann v. Log Co., supra note 3; Weymouth v. Penobscot Log Driv-

ing Co., 71 Me. 29 (i88o).

"For analysis of this problem see Rottschaeffer, The Field of Governmental Price Control (1926) 35 YALE L. J. 438; (927) 75 U. OF PA. L. REv.
778; Finkelstine, From Mu1n v. Illinois to Tyson v. Bantoh (1927) 27 CoLL. REv. 769.
'German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Lewis, 233 U. S.389 (1914).
"The Pipe Line Cases, 234 U. S. 548 (1914).
22o

"Oklahoma Light & Power Co. v. Corporation Commission, 96 Okla. I9,
Pac. 54 (1923).
"Public Utility Commission v. The Monarch Refrigerating Co., 267 Ill.

528, io8 N. E. 716 (1915).

'1American Coal Mining Co. v. Special Coal and Food Commission, 268
Fed. 563 (D. C. Ind. i92o).
"Block v. Hirch, 256 U. S. 135 (i92) ; Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman,
256 U. S. 170 (92).
See Wickersham, The Police Power and the New York
Emergency Rent Laws (i92i) 69 U. OF PA. L. REv. 3ol.

'1 The point of view of Bridges, J., dissenting judge in the state court
(i37 Wash. 6o2, 243 Pac. 838 [1926]) is that the regulation is an unwarranted
extension of this doctrine of "business affected the public interest."
1

2

i922) §§459, 460. See note 2, infra.
Roche v. McDonald, 136 Wash. 322, 239 Pac. 1015 (1925). The interWAS H. Comp. STAT. (Remington,

pretation of the statute by Ihe Washington court, extending it beyond its literal terms, must be accepted. The decision of the Washington Supreme Court
is annotated in (1926) 26 CoL L. REv. 464, and (1926) I WAsH. L. REv. 284.

RECENT CASES
to defeat recognition of the Oregon judgment was error. Roche v. McDonaid, 48 Sup. Ct 142 (U. S. 1928).
3
The full faith and credit clause, it was decided in three early cases,
makes a plea of nil debet to a declaration upon a judgment rendered in another
state inadmissible because the plea's effect would be to put at issue the merits
of the case already concluded by the original judgment It was said' that a
plea of inul tiel record would be proper since matter admitted under it would
not merely attack the accuracy of the judgment but would deny its very exist5
ence. The distinction is illustrated by the rule that before crediting the judgment of a sister state, a court may inquire into the original proceedings to determine whether there was a lack of jurisdiction of either subject matter or
parties. The difficult problem is whether a state must recognize a judgment
which would never have been rendered had the suit been brought originally in
the state asked to give recognition. Here a nice distinction has been drawn.
It has been held that if the court of the state now asked to give recognition
lacks jurisdiction of the sort of subject matter upon which the original suit
7
was based it is not required to give faith to the judgment. But if the subject
would have given it
jurisdiction
grant
of
matter was such that the court's
power to entertain the original suit, but the state's law or public policy would
have imposed upon the court the dity to decide oppositely, the state is not
relieved from recognizing the judgment of the sister state.' Under the rule
'Armstrong v. Carson's Executors, 2 Dallas 302 (C. C. Pa. I794) ; Mills
v. Duryee, 7 Cranch 481 (U. S. 1813); Hampton v. M'Connel, 3 Wheat. 234

(U. S. 1818).
"Story, J., in Mills v. Duryee, stpra note 3 at 484. Johnson, J., dissented,
asserting that the two pleas did not, at common law, have the effects claimed
for them.
'A formula, since often relied upon, was announced by Marshall, C. J.,
in Hampton v. M'Connel, supra note 3 at 325: ". • , whatever pleas would
be good to a suit thereon in such state [i. e. on the judgment in the state which
rendered it], and none others, could be pleaded in any other court in the United
States." Cf. Wilson, I., in Armstrong v. Carson's Executors, supra note 3 at
302: "If the plea would be bad, in the courts of New Jersey [where judgment
was rendered], it is bad here."
'Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall. 457 (U. S. 1873); Andrews v. Andrews,
x88 U. S. 14 (1903).
"Anglo-American Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co. (No. I), 191
U. S. 373 (I9o3). In Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., I27 U. S. 265 (1888), the
Supreme Court refused to entertain a suit on a judgment recovered in an action by a state in its own court for a penalty. The ground was that the Supreme
Court had no original jurisdiction if the original controversy was penal. Both
in this case. and in the Anglo-American case the court declared that the full
faith and credit clause and the legislation under it "establish a rule of evidence rather than of jurisdiction." It is submitted that this "rule of evidence"
is really a rule of substantive law, for the "presumption" in favor of the judgment of the sister state is conclusive and may not be rebutted.
'Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U. S. 230 (1907), annotated in (19o8) 57 U. OF
PA. L. Rnv. 184. Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the majority, when confronted with Wisconsin v. Pelican Insurance Co., supea note 7, dismissed that
court's investigation into the original penal action as dictum. Justice White, for
the minority, forcibly pointed out that the court could not have there decided
that it had no jurisdiction without first holding that it might go back of the
judgment before it to determine whether the original action was penal.
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9
of the early cases it would seem that the duty of a court to recognize a judgment of a sister state could not be made to depend upon its capacity to have
entertained jurisdiction of the original suit, for its own lack of jurisdiction
of the original subject matter could not possibly make a nullity of the judgment if the court which rendered it had jurisdiction. The exception having
been made in this class of cases, it is still difficult to see why the policy which
dictated it should not dictate a similar exception in the other class of cases.
Of the latter sort is the principal case. Oregon had jurisdiction of the parties
and of the subject matter. It was a suit which a Washington court would
have had the power to entertain but the duty to have decided oppositely. Yet
surely no theoretical distinction between power and duty can lessen the violence done to the public policy of Washington.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-TA XATION BY THE UNITED
FUNCTIONS-ADITOR APPoINTED BY CouRT-Plaintiff was

STATES OF STATE

appointed, by order

of a state court under a rule of court, "standing examiner" or "auditor" to
report to the court the financial standing of corporations which make applications to be approved as sureties on various bonds required by the court. At
the time of applying for approval these corporations deposit with the clerk
of the court a certain sum of money, a designated part of which is then paid
to the examiner. The plaintiff objects to the federal income tax on his compensation so received. Held, that this income is taxable. Miller v. McCaughn,
22 F. (2d)
65 (E. D. Pa. 1927).'
Although there is no express constitutional provision which prohibits the
United States from taxing the means and instrumentalities of the various
states, it is well settled that such limitation is placed upon the federal power
to tax.2 Aside from any specific exemption in the taxing statute itself,3 this
exemption rests, as a matter of constitutional law, upon the states' right of
self-preservation, a necessary implication from our dual-sovereignty system of
government.' The theory being that the states' agents should be free from
federal control, exercised, among other ways, by taxing their incomes, the
problem resolves itself into a determination of who are state agents.' A disSee notes 3 and 5, supra.
'Accord: C. B. V-I, 222 (1926) (apparently the same case submitted
to the Treasury Department for its opinion).
2Collector
v. Day, ii Wall. 113 (U. S. 1871); Ambrosini v. United States,
187 U. S. I (I9o2) ; South Carolina v. United States, 199 U. S. 437 (x95).
'The first three Revenue Acts passed after the Sixteenth Amendment
(Acts of X913, 1916 and 1917) expressly exempted from taxable income the
salaries of state officers and employees. The Act of 1926 (44 STAT. 130, § 121)
provides for a refund of any tax imposed by the Act of 1924 or any prior act,
though no act since the one of 1917 has contained the express exemption mentioned.
4
Cases cited supra hote 2 to which may be added the recent case of Metcalf v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514 (1926).
'Metcalf v. Mitchell, supra note 4, 9t 526; Fleming v. Bowers, ii F. (2d)
789 (S. D. N. Y. 1926) ; C. B. i, 96 (i919).

RECENT CASES
tinction is often made between officers and employees,' but since both are
exempt if they are state functionaries,' the distinction is of little practical
importance. That the one claiming the exemption must represent the state
in its exercise of a governmental as contrasted with a private function is well
established 9 Then too, if the employment is merely temporary or occasional,
(,r for the accomplishment of some specific object, the income received therefrom is considered taxable Also, it is said that the position must be created
by law, not mere agreement." And it has been held that the fact that the
"services are compensated for by fees and not by salary is of no importance." "
On this point the court in the principal case, without any reference to these
prior holdings, laid down the rule that the compensation, to be exempt, "must
come to him (state officer or employee) from the state." Regardless of which
of these views is adopted, it seems that this element, like all the others enumerated above, is only one of the many factors to be considered in determining whether or not the individual is a governmental instrumentality of the
state. No one test should control. Another criterion, an aid in the solution of
many constitutional difficulties which has as yet received no attention in the
cases, may be added, i. e., whether the individual has been regarded historically
as an agent of the state."

CaimiNAL LAW-UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLY-UNLAVFUL PuRPosE NOT RE-

QuIED-Workers taking part in an industrial strike assembled in order to
protest against supposed oppression by the police. Members of the police feared
violence, and met with some opposition in dispersing the crowd. The defendants were indicted for unlawful assembly and convicted. They appeal on the
ground that no unlawful purpose was shown by the evidence. Held, that an
unlawful purpose is not an element of the crime. State v. Butterworth, 139
Atl. 16I (N. J. I927).
At common law, an unlawful assembly is an offense against the public
peace, and takes place when three or more persons meet with a common
'Metcalf v. Mitchell, supra note 4, at 520, 521; Treas. Dept. Reg. 69, Art.
88; FouI=E, THE FEDERAL INcOME TAX (927) 56; HOLMES, FEDERAL TAXES
(6th ed. 1925) 541.
"Metcalf v. Mitchell, Treas. Dept. Reg., both supra note 6. As to the statutory provisions, see supra note 3.
'South Carolina v. United States, supra note 2; Fidelity & Deposit Co. of
Md. v. Pa., 24o U. S. 319 (1916) ; Lyons v. Reinecke, io F. (2d) 3 (C. C. A.
7th, 1925); Lindsay v. Bowers, 17 F. (2d) 264 (S. D. N. Y. 1927); Frey v.
Woodworth, 2 F. (2d) 725 (E. D. Mich. 1924).
9
C. B. I-i, lO3 (1922) (master appointed by Pennsylvania court not ex-

empt because only a temporary court officer) ; FouE, loc. cit. supra note 6;
HOLMES, loc. cit. supra note 6; Treas. Dept. Reg. 69, Art. 88.
loc. cit. supra note 6; HOLMES, loc. cit. supra note 6; Metcalf
"Fou=c,
v. Mitchell, supra note 4, at 520; Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md. v. Pa., supra
note 8, at 323.

'Bettman v. Warwick, io8 Fed. 46, 48 (C. C. A. 6th, igoi).
C. B. IV-2, 46 (1925).
"Cf. South Carolina v. United States, supra note 2.

Accord:
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purpose, and under such circumstances that a disturbance of the peace is
likely to result.' If the common purpose contemplates the commission of
either a lawful or unlawful act with violence and tumult, then it needs only an
overt act in pursuance thereof to raise the offense to a rout or a riot,' and
the assembly is ipso facto unlawful.3 And. this is apparently the statutory
definition of an unlawful assembly in many jurisdictions. But where the
meeting takes place under such circumstances as alarm persons of reasonable
courage, it is unlawful at common law, though no violence is actually intended f the only purpose necessary being "such as might be implied by assembling in such manner."' And it is under this class that the principal case
falls. The absence of the requirement of criminal intent and the requirement
that the public be alarmed is indeed reminiscent of tort rather than of criminal liability. This characteristic was noted at an early time, as Chief Justice
Holt, in speaking of the crime of unlawful assembly, "called it a kind of assault upon the people." " The law, while it guarantees the right to assemble
peaceably, evidently puts an extraordinary duty upon those who take advantage
of it to take care that the public is not alarmed.'
DAMAGEs-APPORTIONMENT OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES BY THE JuRY-A corporation was joined with its servant as defendant in an action of tort based
solely on the wilful misconduct of the servant. The jury awarded both compensatory and punitive damages against both defendants, and apportioned the
latter so that the punitive damages against the master were five times those
against the servant. Both defendants appealed, contending that the verdict was
improper. Held, (two justices dissenting) that the verdict assessing larger
punitive damages against the master than against the servant is valid. Johnson

v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 14o S. E. 443 (S.

C. 1927).

13 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW (IIth ed. I912) 2o48.
2
A route is an attempt at riot. A riot is an executed tumultuous disturbance of the public peace by three or more persons acting in concert. Field v.
Receiver of Metropolitan Police [1907] 2 K. B. 853; 3 WHARTO N, op. cit. supra
note I, at 2050.
'Rex v. Birt, 5 Car. & P. I54 (83); Rex v. Brodribb, 6 Car. & P. 57I

(I816).
4
Blackwell v. State, 3o Tex. App. 672, i8 S. W. 676 (1892); People v.
Most, i28 N. Y. io8, 27 N. E. 97o (I89I); Bonneville v. State, 53 Wis.
68o (1882).
'The jury must consider the manner in which the meeting was held,
the hour of the day, the language used, etc. Regina v. Vincent, 9 Car. & P.
91 (1839) ; Redford v. Birley, 3 Starkie 76 (1839) ; i HAWKINxs, PLEAS OF
THE CROWN (8th ed. 1824) 56.
' Bonneville v. State, supra note 4, at 684.

"Regina v. Soley, 2 Salkeld 593 (I795). In another report of the same
case (ii Mod. H5) it was said that "such an act as will make a trespass will
make a riot."
8
See charge to the grand jury of Alderson, B., in Regina v. Vincent,
supra note 5, at 93, n. (a). For a discussion of the practical difficulties in
applying the law, see Riots, Routs, and Unlawful Assemblies, (1844) 3 AMER.
L. M. 350.

RECENT CASES
At common law, a jury was not permitted to apportion damages among
joint defendants in actions ex delictu.' But South Carolina, so long ago as
1784, departed from this rule and permitted damages to be apportioned when
all the defendants were actuated by wilfulness. Prior to a case expressly
overruled' by the principal one, the question bad never arisen as to whether
punitive damages should be apportioned between joint defendants, when one
of them was innocent of all wilfulness, and was liable only because it was
the employer of the wilful wrongdoer. In that case apportionment was denied; not because it involved holding an innocent master liable for punitive
damages," and as a joint defendant with the wilful wrongdoer,' for South
Carolina is committed to both these doctrines;' but because it would impair
the rights of either the master or the servant in the subsequent question between them of reimbursement to the master. This is the ground of the
dissent in the principal case. The majority of the court in the principal case,
however, were of the opinion that since the master and the servant were both
liable for punitive damages, the former should be assessed more heavily because it is settled that the fair measure of such damages is the pecuniary
condition of the defendant. And they considered the matter of reimbursement
as an extraneous question. Thus a defendant, innocent of all wilfulness must
pay punitive damages five times as heavily as the wilful wrongdoer. Such
a verdict is repugnant to the theory of punitive damages: that they are to
punish wilfulness,' and so should not be assessed against a defendant innocent of it' The verdict is also inconsistent with the reason that induced
South Carolina to permit apportioned damages: that the jury might apportion

'Hill v. Goodchild, 5 Burr. 2790 (Eng. 1771); Whittaker v. Tatem, 48
Conn. 52o (i88I); McCarthy v. De Armit, 99 Pa. 63 (1881).
2
White v. McNeily, x Bay ii (S. C. 1784).
'Jenkins v. Southern Ry., 130 S. C. 18o, 125 S. E. 912 (1924). It is interesting to note that this, as well as the principal case, was decided by a majority
of one, and that the dissenting opinion of the principal case was written by
the justice who wrote the majority opinion of the overruled case.
'Goddard v. Grand Trunk Ry., 57 Me. 202 (1869) ; Boyer & Co. v. Coxen,
Contra: Lake Shore, etc., R. R. v. Prentice,
92 Md. 366, 48 Atl. I6i (igoi).
147 U. S. 101 (1892).
'Mitchell v. Allestry, 3 Keb. 65o (Eng. 1676); Phelps v. Wait, 30 N. Y.
78
(1864). Contra: Warax v. Cincinnati, etc., R. R, 72 Fed. 637 (C. C. Ky.
1896).
'Brown v. American Telephone, etc., Co., 82 S. C. 173, 63 S. E. 744 (o9)
(where it was held that an innocent master is liable for punitive damages) ;
Schumpert v. Southern Ry., 65 S. C. 332, 43 S. E. 813 (1903)

(where it was

held that the master should be joined as a defendant with the wilful servant).
'Brown v. Evans, 17 Fed. 912 (C. C. Nev. 1883); McBride v. McLaughlin, 5 Watts 375 (Pa. 1836); Calder v. Southern Ry., 89 S. C. 287, 71 S. E.
841 (911).
'Wilkes v. Wood, Lofft i (Eng. 1763); Lake Shore, etc., R. R. v. Prentice, supra note 4; Hygienic Fleeced Underwear Co. v. Way, 15 Pa. Dist. 943
(i9o6).
'Lake Shore, etc., R. R. v. Prentice, smtpra note 4; Nelson v. Halvorson,
117 MinnL 255, 135 N. W. 818 (1912); McCarthy v. De Armit, supra note i.
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them "agreeable to the degree of guilt of each trespasser." 0 This decision
does not, it seems, stultify either the theory of punitive damages or the South
Carolina rule of apportioned damages. It seems rather to be the anomalous
conclusion to which a court will be forced in a jurisdiction which allows
apportioned damages, if it permits a master and servant to be joined as codefendants, and the assessment of punitive damages against the master, both
of which are questionable doctrines.

EQUITY-JURisDIcTION TO SET ASIDE A DECREE OF THE PROBATE COURTThe plaintiff, a residuary legatee of an estate, brought this bill in equity to set
aside the decree of the probate court authorizing the executor of the estate
to sell certain shares of stock belonging to the estate. The bill alleged that the
executors and the defendant conspired to defraud the estate, and by a fraud
perpetrated upon the court caused the decree to be issued authorizing the executor to sell to the defendants for $1OOO the stock worth in excess of $xooooo.
Held, that equity had no jurisdiction to set aside the decree. Farquharv. New
Enzglamd Trust Co., 158 N. E. 836 (Mass. 1927).
Originally, the only tribunal that had jurisdiction over administration of
When statutes were passed creating proestates was the court of chancery.'
bate courts, the question arose as to whether courts of chancery retained con2
current jurisdiction over matters of administration, with probate courts. This
in
Massachubut
states,'
concurrent jurisdiction has been recognized in some
setts a long line of cases has established the exclusive jurisdiction of the probate court over all matters pertaining to administration of estates.' But prev*ous to the principal case there was no direct decision in Massachusetts holding that a court of equity did not have jurisdiction to prevent the enforcement
of a decree of a probate court, obtained by a fraud upon the court; although
5
several cases contained dicta to that effect. On principle, the decision of the
principal case can be questioned. The fact that the probate court is accorded exclusive jurisdiction in the first instance should not differentiate it from any
0

White v. McNeily, supra note

2.

The jurisdiction of equity was based upon the trust relation existing
between an administrator and the creditors and distributees, and because in
cases involving administration the remedy in the ecclesiastical and common
was very defective. 2 STORY, EQurrY JURISPRUDENCE, (i4th ed.
law courts737-739.
1886) §§
'For an exhaustive annotation of the law on this subject, see 3 PomERoY,
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. I919) § 1154.
'Alabama, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Mississippi, New Jersey,
North Carolina, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Virginia, District of Columbia, and
the federal courts.
'Sever v. Russell, 4 Cush. 513 (Mass. 1849) ; Conners v. Cunard Steamship Co., 204 Mass. 310, go N. E. 6or (191o); Joyce v. Thompson, 229 Mass.
io6, 118 N. E. 184 (x918).
'Jenison v. Hapgood, 7 Pick. I (Mass. 1828); Waters v. Stickney, 12
Allen I (Mass. 1866).
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other court possessing exclusive jurisdiction over matters entrusted to it.! The
power to prevent the enforcement of decrees obtained by a fraud practised
on the court is one of the well established and most useful grounds of equitable jurisdiction.

HUSBAND AND WIFE-DsABILiTY OF A WIFE IN A Sur COMMENCED BEroR MARRrAGE-The defendant, while driving negligently, injured the plaintiff. A suit was commenced by the service of a writ. Before the trial', the
adverse parties were married. Held, that judgment be arrested. Cardanwne
v. Cardamone, 9 D. & C. 723 (Pa. 1927).
The result reached in the principal case calls for an interpretation of the
rule denying recovery by one spouse against the other for a personal tort. The
problem 'may be a lack of right, i. e., the husband owing no substantive tort
duty to the wife, or it may be procedural, i. e., a lack of remedy. Since the
tort was committed before coverture the existence of a right is clear in this
case. The prohibition that one spouse cannot "sue or be sued" by the other
is contained, in Pennsylvania, in the Married Women's Property Act of z93.Z
One of the exceptions listed in this Act is that a wife can sue her husband to
protect and recover her separate property. The court reasoned that the plaintiff's chose in action was not included within the term "separate property,"
since unliquidated damages are not property.' As to the terms "sue or be sued,"
the court said that to sue means to carry through to completion. Therefore
even though the suit was commenced before marriage, by a change in the status
of the parties, the plaintiff subjected herself to the disabilities of coverture, and
lost, for the time, the remedy she had for the defendant's tort
The case is
novel on its facts,' and the principal deducible is in accord with the common

'Froelich

v. Lane, 45 Ore. 13, 76 Pac. 351 (1904).

JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925)

See 3 FRElAN

§ 1184.

' Philips v. Barnet, i Q. B. D. 436 (1876); Keister v. Keister, 123 Va.
157, 96 S. E. 315 (1918). See Note (1925) 38 HARV. L. REv. 383, 389; Note
(924)
33 YALE L. J. 315, 318.
'Act of 1913, P. L. 14, PA. STAT. (West, i92o) § i46o2. "Wife may sue
and be sued civilly in all respects and in any form of action and with the same
effect and results and consequences as an unmarried person; but she may not
sue her husband, except in a proceeding for divorce, or in a proceeding to
protect and recover her separate property." Amending the Act of 1893, P. L.

344 §3.

'Miller v. Miller, 44 Pa. 17o, 172 (1856); Smith v. Smith, 67 Pitts. L..
599 (igig). But see Walker v. City of Philadelphia, 195 Pa. 168, 173, 45 AtI.
657 (19oo). Cf. Prosser v. Prosser, 114 S. C. 45, 1O2 S. E. 787 (192o);
Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 89 At. 889 (1914).
"See Kuhlence v. Vocht, 4 Pa. C. C. Rep. 370, 372 (1888) ; Newton v.
Weber, 196 N. Y. Supp. 113, 114 (92).
'See Albertsworth, Recognition of New Interests in the Law of Torts
(1922) 1O CAr- L. REV. 461, 471, 48o.
"Newton v. Weber, 196 N. Y. Supp. 113 (1922)
(a similar case).
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law, i. e., that there can be no recovery by one spouse against the other7 although such a result was attained by a debatable construction of the words of
the Pennsylvania statute.

INSURANCE-REFUSAL

OF INSURED TO SUBMIT TO SURGICAL AID AS A DE-

PoLIcY-The plaintiff, rendered permanently incapable of all gainful occupation by an accident, sued the defendant on policies
of disability insurance. The defense was based on the plaintiff's refusal to submit to a minor surgical operation, attended by practically no danger of serious
consequences, which, it was proved, would restore the plaintiff to health. No
express provision in the policy imposed such a duty on the insured. Held, that
the plaintiff recover, as he has no duty to submit to the operation. Tittsworth
v. Ohio Natiotwl Insurance Co., Tenn. Ct. of App., decided December, 1927.
In tort cases based on negligence the rule is well established that subsequent conduct of the injured person in failing to care for his injuries in a reasonably prudent manner may preclude him from recovery This duty may require him to submit to an operation attended by almost no risk? But the question whether a person is guilty of negligence in permitting an extension of the
injury does not arise in actions ex contractu based on an insurance policy 3
"The only questions are first, whether the injury was occasioned by an
accident within the meaning of the policy, and if so, whether it was within
one of the exceptions."' The question, then, is how far the court will go in
implying conditions in a contract of insurance. What authority there is for
thm view that the tbrt rule applies to the same extent in contract cases seems
wrong on principle.3 The mutual rights and liabilities can be determined only
by reference to the terms of the contract which the parties themselves made.
In the absence of expressly excepted risks, an accident policy must be taken
to insure even against the negligence of the insured himself.6 As the insurer
may frame his own terms, and vary the amount of the premiums accordingly, the law interprets these "adhesion" contracts as strictly as possible
FENSE TO AN ACTION ON THE

Phillips v. Barnet, supra note I.
'Donovan v. New Orleans R. R., 132 La. 239, 61 So. 216 (1913).
See
48 L. R. A. (N. s.) 11O.
2
Leitzell v. Delaware, L. & W. R. R., 232 Pa. 475, 81 Atl. 543 (1911).
'Banta v. Continental Casualty Co., 134 Mo. App. 222, 113 S. W. 1140

(1908).
"Lovelace v. Traveler's Protective Assn., 126 Mo. 1O4, 28 S. W. 877
(1894).
'Maryland Casualty Co. v. Chew, 92 Ark. 276, 122 S.W. 642 (19o9). In
this case, which arose on facts very similar to those in the principal case, the
court stated: "It has been held in cases of personal injury that no damages
should be allowed the injured party for any impairment of health or physical
condition occasioned by his neglect to observe the instructions of his physicians.
On the same principle no indemity should be allowed to an assured in actions
like this on account of an extension of the injury where such extension is occasioned by his neglect to observe such directions."
'Cumberland Protective Co. v. Douglas, 58 Pa. 419 (1868).

RECENT CASES
against the insurers." However, it has been held in well considered cases that
the insurer is not liable when the negligence is so gross as to amount to fraud8
And the plaintiff in the instant case could not recover under workmen's compensation acts. In these acts it is usually provided that the employer must
furnish, and the employee must accept, reasonable surgical and medical services
Here, the duty to submit to surgical attention is imposed by statute,
and in the tort cases, it is imposed by the common law. The principal case
is to be commended for not implying such a duty in an express contract of
insurance.

JUDGMENTS-AcQuII-rAL IN CRIMINAL CASE AS RES JUDICATA IN FORFEITURE PROCEEDINGs-The state petitioned for the forfeiture of certain intdxi-

cating liquors alleged to have been possessed by defendant- in violation of a
local statute1 The defendant set up his acquittal in the same court on a charge
of illegally possessing the liquors as a bar to the present suit, and asked that
the liquors be returned to him. The trial court ordered a return of the liquors.
Held, that the order was error since the acquittal in the criminal case was not
res judicata as to the illegality of the res. Comnwnwealth v. Certain Confiscated Liquors, 91 Pa. Super. i65 (1927).
In actions to effect forfeitures, the courts have adopted two distinct methods of approach.. One line of decisions considers the forfeiture as a penalty,'
the enforcement of which is dependent upon the outcome of the criminal prosecution of the owner. Thus, in Coffey v. Uitited States,' the Supreme Court
held that under the Intental Revenne Act,' a judgment of acquittal renlered
in favor of the owner of an automobile, was a bar to subsequent libel proceedings to forfeit the car, on the ground that, as between the parties, the facts
had been conclusively determined in defendant's favor. The other line of cases
proceeds on the principle that such actions, although of a quasi-criminal nature, are civil actions, strictly in reim' The theory is that the res is considered
primarily the offender and "that which works the forfeiture, the guilt or innocence of its owner being accidental."' Under modem statutes dealing with
CONTRACTS (i92o) §§621, 675.
'National Insurance Co. v. Webster, 83 Ill. 470 (1876).
'For similar provisions in Pa., see Act of i919, P. L. 642 § I, P& STAT.
(West, 1920) § 21997.
"WILLISTON,

'Act of March 27, 1923, P. L. 34, PA. STAT. SuPP. (West, 1924)
§ I4098a-II.
'See State v. Adams, 72 Vt 253, 47 At. 779 (Ioo). See Note, ii L. R.
A. (N. s.) 664 (i9o8).
'ix6 U. S. 436 (i886). In United States v. One Ford, 21 F. (2d) 628 (D.
C. Neb. 1927), a federal court held that judgment of conviction in the criminal
case was conclusive of the car's guilt in the later forfeiture suit.
1I4 STAT. 98, ISI (1866), U. S. C. (925)
TIT. XXVI, § 1181.
Snyder v. United States, 112 U. S. 216 (1884); The Palmyra, 12 Wheat.
I (U.6 S. I827) ; Logan v. United States, 26o Fed. 746 (C. C. A. 5th, i919).
Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U. S. 505, 513 (0gI).
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liquor transportation, courts, as in the principal case, have usually adopted
this view.! The general rule 8 that criminal judgments are not res judicata as
to rights in civil actions, and vice versa, is then applied as a matter of course.
The principal case is theoretically sound, and is especially to be preferred where
the rights of innocent owners, lienors, and conditional vendors are concerned.
The Coffey case has a practical appeal in recognizing that an inanimate object
cannot be an offender.
JUDGMENTS-VACATING

JUDGMENT FOR

PERJURY

AFTER ExPIRATIoN

OF

TERM-In an action for damages, there was a judgment for the defendants, who
are the petitioners in this case. After the term at which the judgment was
rendered had expired, and after the Circuit Court of Appeals had affirmed the
judgment, the District Court set it aside on the ground of after-discovered
perjury. The Circuit Court refused to issue a writ of mandamus to compel
it to reinstate the judgment and the petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court.
Held, that the District Court could not vacate the judgment after the term had
expired, and that mandamus would issue to compel its reinstatement. Delaware,
Lackawanna & Western Ry. v. Reistab, Audge of U. S. District Court, U. S.
Sup. Ct., decided Jan. 16, 1928.

The common law rule is that judgments become final at the end of the
term in which they are rendered,1 unless, within that term, proceedings to vacate them are commenced; in which case they may be carried over to the follwing term. It would seem, therefore, that the consent of both parties would
not give the courts power to vacate judgments after the term; but there are
decisions to the contrary. An exception to the rule permits them to do so,
however, for extrinsic irregularities in procedure.' Many state courts, either
by a liberal interpretation of the common law, or by statute, are less stringent
State v. Hoffman, 85 Or. 276, 166 Pac. 765 (1917) ; State v. Certain Intoxicating Liquors, 53 Utah 171, 177 Pac. 235 (1918) ; (1925) 74 U. OF PA.
L. REV. 170; (1927) 12 IOWA L. REv. 283.
'Lewis v. Frick, 233 U. S. 291 (1914) ; Wingrove v. Traction Co., 237 Pa.
549, 85 AtI. 85o (1912) ; 2 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) § 653 et seq.
112

In re Metropolitan Trust Co., 218 U. S. 312 (191o) ; Ayres v. Wiswall,
U.. S. 187 (1884) ; Bronson v. Schulten, 104 U. S. 410 (1881) ; Sibbald

v. United States, 12 Pet. 488 (U. S. 1838); Phillips v. Negley, 117 U. S. 665
(i885).
'People v. Wells, 255 IIl. 450, 99 N. E. 6o6 (1912); Algee v. Algee, 168
Ky. 362, 182 S. W. 197 (1916); Niles v. Parks, 49 Ohio St. 370, 34 N. E.
735 (1892); Wasatch Mining Co. v. Jennings, 14 Utah 221, 46 Pac. iio6
(1896). But see Stave Company's Appeal, 225 Pa. 178, 73 At. 11o7 (1909).
'Sheridan v. City of Chicago, 175 Ill. 421, 51 N. E. 898 (1898) ; Hewetson
172 Ill. 112, 49 N. E. 992 (0898); City of Philadelphia
v. Coulston, 118 Pa. 541, I2 Atl. 604 (1888).
' x FREEMANj JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) §§ 196, 198. But this is very lim-

v. City of Chicago,

ited in the federal courts, and includes only a few irregularities which grew
out of the obsolete writ of error, coram vobis, which permitted the correction
of errors of process, judgments dismissed by mistake, etc. Wetmore v. Karrick, 2o5 U. S. 141 (19o7) ; Bronson v. Schulten, supra note 1.

RECENT CASES
than the federal courts, and after the expiration of a term permit relief from
judgments obtained by mistake or by fraud of one of the parties.' New York
considers its courts to have an inherent power to so vacate judgments for any
substantial reason 0 Pennsylvania, more strict, permits the opening of a judgment after the terin has expired so that a defense may be entered, but does not
allow such a judgment to be vacated" unless for irregularities that appear on
In accord with many other states, it considers judgthe face of the record
ments by default or confession as always "within the breast of the court." o
Under the federal rule, however, perjury, being an intrinsic part of the case,
is not considered an irregularity that justifies such a vacation after the term
has expired. The decision in the principal case illustrates the tendency to narrowly restrict perjury as a ground for vacating judgments, a tendency which
has resulted in refusals to vacate for perjury even during the term when the
judgment was rendered."

NEGLIGENcE-INJuRY TO A CHARTERER CAUSED By NEGLIGENT DELAY OF

A REPAIRMA-Libellants were charterers of a ship, a term of the charter
party requiring the owners to make certain repairs on the ship at specified
intervals. In pursuance of this obligation, the owners made a contract with
the defendant, in which the latter agreed to perform the repairs. The defendant, however, was not notified of the existence of the charter party. Due to
the negligence of the defendant in making the repairs, the charterers were deprived of the use of the vessel for a period of two weeks. In an action by the
charterers against the defendant, the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a decree
of the District Court for the libellants.1 Held, on certiorari,that libellants
could not recover. Robins Dry Dock Co. v. Flint, U. S. Sup. Ct, decided
December 12, 1927.
The libellants instituted the present action on two theories, namely that
they were beneficiaries of the contract made between the defendant and the
'Seeds v. American Bridge Co., 68 Kan. 522, 75 Pac. 481 (904) ; Meyers
v. Thompson, 117 Me. 8o, 162 At. 776 (1918) ; Mayor of New York v. Pettigrew, 17 How Prac. 492 (N. Y. 1859).
'Manahan v. Petroleum Refining Co., i98 App. Div. I92, 189 N. Y. Supp.
127 (i92I), where the court said: "The general power of the court to vacate, set
aside . . . its final orders for sufficient reason . . . is well recognized and'
not dependent on any express statute, but is a power inherent in the court itself."
City of Philadelphia v. Coulston, mupra note 3; Commonwealth v. Rishebegar, 67 Pa. Super. 344 (1917) ; Johnson v. Royal Ins. Co., 218 Pa. 423, 67
AUt. 749 (Iqo7).
8
Saupp v. Streit, 258 Pa. 211, ioI At. 939 (1917) ; Bowman v. Berkley,
259 Pa. 327, IO3 At. 49 (I918) ; Commonwealth v. Rishebegar, supra note 7.
Stave Company's Appeal, supra note 2.
Phillips v. Negley, supra note I; 3 FREEMAN, op. cit. supra note 4, § 1241.
For a discussion of perjury as a ground for vacating judgment, see (1923)
36 HARv. L. REv. 1033.
113 F. (2d) (C. C. A.

2d,

1926).
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owners, and that the defendant's tortious injury to the ship was the proximate
cause of the damage suffered by them. The Supreme Court decided, in respect
to the first contention, that however liberally the contract was construed, the
libellants at most were mere incidental beneficiaries, and as such were not intended to have a right of action on the contract0 The question of liability in
tort seems to be equally dear. As a general rule a tort-feasor is not liable
for damage to a third person in contractual relations with the party directly
injured, unless such a result was intended? Liability is only extended in rare
,cases where, in spite of the contract, an ordinarily prudent man could foresee
an injury to the third party if due care was not exercised.' In the instant
case, it can not be logically argued that the defendant should have known of
libellants' interest in the ship, and consequently there was no duty imposed
upon the former, in respect to the libellants, to use due care in making the
repairs. The theory on which the Circuit Court allowed a recovery was also
considered. That court was of the opinion that, as the owners could have
recovered full damages for the loss of the use of the ship, in which event the
-charterers would have been entitled to a part of the sum recovered, there was
no injustice in permitting the charterers, as bailors, to recover their interest directly.' The Supreme Court disposed of this fallacious argument by pointing
out the fact that no bailment' existed in the case at bar, and that the owners
recovered, not as bailees, but on a contract.
PATENTs-ANTICIPATION--CO-PENDING

APPLICATIONS FILED BY THE SAME

INVENTOR-In a suit to enjoin the infringement of a patent, the defense was

made that the patent in suit was invalid because anticipated by a disclosurb
made in the specification of an earlier patent issued to the same inventor upon
a co-pending application. Held, that the earlier patent does not anticipate.
1'raitel Marble Co. v. Hungerford Brass Co., 22 F. (2d) 259 (C. C. A. 2d,
2927).

A patent is ordinarily invalid if it is anticipated by a disclosure in a prior
Vpatent earlier applied for,' even though the prior patent was issued to the
'German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Home Water Co., 226 U. S. 220
(1912) ; Erie v. Diefendorf 278 Pa. 31, 122 Atl. 159 (1923) ; Searles v. Flora,
225 Ill. 167, 8o N. E. 98 (19o6); Fesnire v. National Surety Co., 229 N. Y.
.44, 127 N. E. 472 (1920).
'Connecticut

Mutual Ins. Co. v. New York, etc., R. R., 25 Conn. 265

(1856); Taylor v. Neri, I Esp. N. P. 386 (Eng. 1795); Byrd v. English, 117
,Ga. 192, 43 S. E. 419 (1903) ; (1928) 76 U. OF PA. L. REv. 326.
'Johnson v. Cadillac Motor Car Co., 261 Fed. 878 (C. C. A. 2d, 1919);
Kettern v. Armour Co., 247 Fed. 921 (C. C. A. 2d, 1917); MacPherson v.
Buick Motor Co., 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1O5O (1916).
'The Winkfield [1902] P. 42; Lockhart v. Western & Atlantic R. R.,

73 Ga. 472 (1884); Brewster v. Warner, 136 Mass. 57 (1883).
v. O'Brien, 114 App. Div. 366, lOO N. Y. Supp. 385 (19o6).

See Polack

'Malz v. State, 36 Tex. Cr. App. 447, 37 S. W. 748 (1896).
129 STAT. 692 (1897), U. S. C. (1925) TIT. XXXV, § 31; Pope Mfg. Co.
v. Gormully Co., 144 U. S. 238 (1892); I HOPKINS, PATENTS (1911) § 217;
WALKER, PATENTS (5th ed. 1917) § 57.

RECENT CASES
same inventor.!

However, this rule is subject to a well settled exception that,

where several co-pending applications are filed by the same inventor, a disclosure in the specification of the one first issuing as a patent will not anticipate those issuing later.' Recently a few cases have caused confusion by failing to recognize this exception.4 Probably the reason for the latter cases is
a misapprehension of the rule against double patenting.'
The later patent
is invalid for double patenting only where the claims in the two patents overlap,' and not merely where the specification of the prior patent discloses anticipatory matter
The principal case represents a return to the established
rule, and the decision is to be commended for several reasons. The inventor
may find it impossible to make a complete disclosure without divulging patentable matter beyond the scope of the claims,' and he cannot be said to abandon
this unclaimed disclosure, since he has shown a contrary intention by filing a
co-pending application to cover it'
Furthermore a disclosure made after the
filing date of the second application should not be an anticipation'- And as
the inventor has only limited control over the date when a patent will issue,
be should not be prejudiced by the fact that one of his co-pending applications
issues before another."
'-Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 151 U. S. i86 (1894); Doig v. Morgan Mach.
122 Fed. 46o (C. C. A. 2d, i9o3) ; WALxu,
op. cit. supra note I, § 69.
* Higgin Mfg. Co. v. Watson, 263 Fed. 378 (C. C. A. 6th, i92o); Century Electric Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Co., 191 Fed. 350 (C. C. A. 8th,
19ii); Kinnear Mfg. Co. v. Wilson, 142 Fed. 970 (C. C. A. 2d, igo5). See
I Hopxixs, § 528; WALR-m, § 69, both op. cit. supra note I.
"These are all in the Second Circuit: National, etc., Co. v. Automatic, etc.,
Corp., 15 F. (2d) 257 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926) (expressly overruled by leading
case); Gerrard v. Cary, 9 F. (2d) 949 (E. D. N. Y. 1924), aff'd, 957 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1925); Harvey Hubbel, Inc. v. General Electric Co., 267 Fed. 564 (C.
Co.,

C. A. 2d,

192o).

'For the distinction between anticipation and priority, see Ewing, Anticipa-.
tion and Priority as Defenses to Patent Suits (I92I) 9 GEORGETOWIV L. J.

(No. 4)

12.

'General Bakelite Co. v. General Insulate Co., 276 Fed. i66 (E; D. N. Y.
1921); Kawneer Mfg. Co. v. Toledo Glass Co., 232 Fed. 362 (E. D. Mich.
1915), aff'd, 237 Fed. 364 (C. C. A, 6th, 1916) ; Lovell, Double Patenting with
Relation to Co-Pending Applications, (1926) 9 J. PAT. OFF. Soc. (No. 3) 111.
"Thomson, etc., Co. v. Elmira, etc., Co., 71 Fed. 396 (C. C. A. 2d, 1896).
See I HopxiNs, § 199; WALKER, § i8oa, both op. cit. supra note I.
'And if the disclosure is incomplete the patent will be invalid, because
the grant is without consideration. B~n6 v. Jeantet, 129 U. S. 683 (i889). See
I Hopmiqs, § 48; .WALKER, § 178, both op. cit. supra note I.
'Victor, etc., Co. v. American, etc., Co., 145 Fed. 350 (C. C. A. 2d, i9o6);
Kinnear Mfg. Co. v. Wilson, supra note 3.
"This reason is particularly cogent where the application first issuing was
a divisional of the one later issuing. Benjamin Electric Co. v. Dale Co., 158
Fed. 617 (C. C. A. 2d, I9O7).
'In the extreme case where both patents issue on the same day, this seems
especially true. See Sandy MacGregor Co. v. Vaco Grip Co., 2 F. (2d) 655
(C. C. A. 6th, 1924) (where this reason was applied to a case of priority).
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PRINCIPAL AND SURETY-DISCHARGE OF SURETY BY NEW CONTRACT-The
defendants were sureties on a bond given by a bank to secure repayment of

deposits made by the county during a specified period. At the end of the period the county had a large balance to its credit, which it allowed to remain
on deposit. Subsequently the county entered into a new contract with the
bank, without sureties, to continue the account. Under the new contract deposits were made, and checks were drawn and honored to an amount exceeding
the county's balance at the termination of the original contract period. The
bank then became insolvent. At the date of insolvency, the county's balance
was a sum less than its balance at the termination of the original contract
period, but at no time had the county's balance been smaller than the sum to
its credit at the date of insolvency. The county sought to hold the defendants
liable for the payment of this final balance. Held, (two judges dissenting) that
the defendants are not liable. Board of Commissioners v. Lake State Bank,
26o Pac. 63o (Kan. 1927).

By his contract, a surety on a bond to secure repayment of deposits made
during a specified period is liable for repayment of all deposits made during
that period if the principal debtor fails to pay them, unless there has been
a discharge of the surety

Entering into a new contract for subsequent de-

posits does not discharge the surety on the first contract, as the two contracts
are entirely independent,' unless the new contract operates to alter the old
one in a material way.3 Nor does mere forbearance by the creditor to demand
payment from the principal debtor promptly at the expiration of the period
discharge the surety,' as he has the right to step in and pay the debt whenever
it becomes due and be subrogated to all the rights of the creditor against the
debtor, and thus accelerate action against the debtor.' Thus the question in the
principal case resolves itself into whether or not there was a sufficient payment
by the bank to discharge the sureties. As the bank, subsequent to the termination of the first contract period, honored checks of the county to an amount
exceeding the debt at that time, there was full payment if these payments
might be applied to that debt. Generally, if payments are made to a creditor
by a debtor owing two debts to him, without either party specifying to which
debt they are to be applied, the court will apply the payments to the older
debt.6 But an equitable exception to this rule is that where one debt is secured and the other is not, the unspecified payments will be applied first to
the unsecured debt. Applying this exception to the principal case, it follows
'Campbell v. Sherman, 151 Pa. 970, 25 Atl. 35 (1892).
2Stuts v. Strayer, 6o Ohio St. 384, 54 N. E. 368 (1899); Trumper v.
Hemphill, 8 Leigh 623 (Va. 1837).
'Schuster v. Weiss, 114 Mo. 158, 21 S. W. 438 (1892).
4Moses
v. United States, 166 U. S. 571 (1896); Hawkins v. Minis, 36
Ark. 145 (i88o); Marberger v. Pott, 16 Pa. 9 (1851).
'American Bonding Co. v. Mechanics' Bank, 97 Md. 598, 55 Atl. 395
(19o3); King v. Blackmore, 72 Pa. 347 (1872).
'The Barges 2 & 4, 58 Fed. 425 (S. D. N. Y. 1893) ; Kloepfer v. Maher,
84 N. Y. Supp. 138 (1903) ; Hollister v. Davis, 54 Pa. 5o8 (1867).
'Barbee v. Morri', 221 .Ill. 382, 77 N. E. 589 (19o6); United States Fidelity and Guarantee Co. v. Kansas, 81 Kan. 66o, io6 Pac. 1O4o (191o) ; John-'
son's Appeal, 37 Pa. 268 (186o).
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that the balance remaining unpaid is a part of the secured debt. However,
there remains one line of reasoning by which a discharge of the sureties can
be found. If when the county entered into the new contract with the bank
it had withdrawn its balance and redeposited it under the new contract, this
would have been a full payment and discharge of the sureties But here the
county made a new contract, and instead of drawing out the money and redepositing it under the new contract, a futile thing to do, it impliedly directed
that from the date of the new contract the money to its credit in the bank
was to be held for it under the new contract. This in effect amounted to a
payment and a redeposit under the new contract, and as such discharged the
sureties under the original contract
PnocEnua--AccouNT RENDER IN THE PENNSYLVANIA PRACrICE ACTSection ii of the Pennsylvania Practice Act of 1915 provides that an accounting may be asked for where the plaintiff is unable to state the exact amount
due him by the defendant. Section 17 of the Act provides that a judgment
may be given by the prothonotary in an action of assumpsit when an amount
is admitted to be due in the affidavit of defense. This was an action of assumpsit by one co-tenant against another co-tenant asking therein for an account.
Plaintiff secured a judgment from the prothonotary for the amount admitted
to be due in the affidavit of defense. Subsequently, the court made absolute a
rule to strike the judgment from the record. The Superior Court affirmed
the decision of the lower court Held, on appeal to the Supreme Court, that
the rule should have been dismissed, as the judgment given by the prothonotary
was good under the Practice Act of X915. Duggan v. Duggan, Pa. Sup. Ct.,
decided January 3, 1928.
Prior to the Practice Act of 1915, where an accounting was sought it
cculd only be obtained by the old common law action of account render, or in
equity by a bill asking for an accounting. The Supreme Court has added still
a third manner in which the plaintiff can secure satisfaction, namely, by bringing an action in assumpsit and asking therein for an accounting, and allowing
a judgment to be given by the prothonotary for the amount admitted to be
due in the affidavit of defense The remedy in equity is not rendered nugatory by the fact that the plaintiff now has an adequate remedy in law;' nor
'Chapman v. Collins, 66 Mass. 163 (1853); Barnes v. Cushing, 43 App.
Div. 158, 59 N. Y. Supp. 345 (1899); Pittsburgh v. Rhodes, 230 Pa. 397, 79
Atl. 634 (iii).

'Fidelity and Deposit Co. v. County, log Miss. 879, 69 So. 865 (I915);
Pittsburgh v. Rhodes, sufira note 8.
19
Pa. Super. 369 (i92). See (1928) 76 U. oF PA. L. REv. 328.
'Ozeas v. Johnson, I Birn. i9 (Pa. 18o6); Andrews v. Allen, 9 Serg. &
R. 241 (Pa. 1823); Russell v. Miller, 54 Pa. 154 (1867); Wharton v. Douglass, 76 Pa. 273 (874).
The proceeding in equity is authorized under the Act
of I84O, P. L. [1841] i § i9, PA. STAT. (West, 1920) §16647.
'Miller v. Belmont Co., 268 Pa. 51, nio Ati. 802 (1920).
"Williams v. Finlaw, Mueller & Co., Pa. Sup. Ct., decided Jan. 3, 1928;
(igi8) 66 U. oF PA. L. REv. 207. For instances in which equitable jurisdiction
may be invoked, see 4 PotmEoy, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4 th ed. i9i8) § i42i.
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does the equitable relief deny an acounting in proceedings at law.5 The remedies are concurrent.! The Superior Court' and the lower courts' have previously held that from the title' of the Act itself and from Section i," there
is nothing which would support a contention that the legislation intended to
enlarge the class of claims which may be made the subject of an action of
assumpsit. It is submitted that the Supreme Court has arrived at the preferable
result by their interpretation of the statute. Section ix states that the Act
deals with actions of assumpsit. Then in Section ii it is shown that for the
purposes of this Act an accounting is a corollary to the action of assumpsit.
Therefore, when Section 17 is to be considered, (which simply says assumpsit)
it is to be regarded in the light of Section i as enlarged by Section ii. The
result attained by this construction certainly seems in accord with the object
and intent of the Practice Act of z95, as it simplifies and expedites procedure.
TRa-AL--CoERcIox OF THE JuRY BY THIE CouRT-After the jury had been
out four hours, in a trial for larceny, the court recalled it. There had been
no request for further instructions or suggestion of disagreement by the jury.
The judge asked the jury to indicate the ratio of division, but not to indicate
which party had the majority. The foreman replied, "Ten to two." The jury
was then instructed to decide the case reasonably, and "not to be stubborn."
Defendant appeals from conviction. Held, that the court's action was reversible error. Commonwealth v. Anthony, 91 Pa. Super. 518 (1927).
The question was whether the court's practice constituted coercion of the
jury. In holding that there was coercion, the Superior Court followed the
authority of Brasrfield v. United States.! The state courts are in conflict on

'Shaw v. Newingham, 279 Pa. i8o, 123 Atl. 783 (1924).
'Williams v. Finlaw, Mueller & Co., supra note 4.
"Backer v. Remov, 69 Pa. Super. 138 (918).
In this case it was said
that since §§ ii and 19 of the Practice Act were the only ones that mentioned
an accounting, all other sections of the Act should be construed to deal strictly
with the actions of assumpsit as they were before the Act. Therefore § 17
could not be invoked when the plaintiff sued in assumpsit and asked for an
accounting, and a certain amount was admitted to be due. Such an argument
has merit, but it is submitted that such an interpretation is not in accord
with correct statutory construction, which would read assumpsit throughout
the Act in the light of §§ ii and ig.
' Comerer v. Fraker's Adm'rs, 29 D. R. 491 (Pa. 1920) ; Mastis v. Vincent
B. & P. Society, 44 C. C. 289 (Pa. I916): "The Practice Act of 1915 applies
only to actions of assumpsit and trespass. There is a distinction between the
action of account render and an action of assumpsit."
"'Relating to practice in the courts of common pleas in actions of assumpsit and trespass, except actions for libel and slander."
" "Be it enacted that in actions of assumpsit and trespass, except in actions
of libel and slander, brought in any court of common pleas, the procedure shall
be as herein provided."
'Supra note io.
1272 U. S. 48 (1926), commented on in (1927) 27 Co. L. REV. 756;
(1927) 25 MlCic. L. REv. 296. There the court said that such practice has no
good effect, but based its decision on a mere dictum in Burton v. United States,
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the point. Some cases hold that the practice is not to be commended, but is
not reversible error per se, and say that it is reversible error only when, in view
of all the circumstances, it did actually coerce the jury! Other cases decide
that it is not fatal error where the evidence fully sustains the conviction! It
has also been stated that the practice is commendable, in that it enables the
court to determine whether to discharge the jury or to send it out again.'
There appears to be no decision in Pennsylvania in point,' although other cases
have sustained practice more likely to coerce the jury than in the principal
case.! It is submitted that the practice in question will enable the court to determine the advisability of discharging the jury, and would therefore expedite
the administration of the criminal law. The position of the Superior Court
shows the extent to which modern law has advanced from the old common
law, when it was not only proper, but the duty of the court to coerce the jury
to agree.1
196 U. S. 283, 307 (1905). See also Stewart v. United States, 300 Fed. 768,
782 (C. C. A. 8th, 1924) and comment in (1925) 23 MIcH. L. REV. 296. As
to the advisability of retaining the requirement of unanimous verdicts See:
MOSCHZISlER, TRIAL BY JURY (1924) § 412; (1922) 86 JUST P. 363; Zeisler,
Unanimity of Juries, (1890) PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ILL. STATE BAR Assoc.,
54. 2
Eady v. State, 168 Ark. 731, 271 S. W. 338 (1925) ; Murchinson v. State,
153 Ark. 300, 240 S. W. 402 (1922) ; Varnum v. State, 25 Ga. App. 560, IO3
S. E. 742 (192o).
' Flahive v. State, io Ga. App. 401, 73 S. E. 536 (191i)
; Twyman v. State,
96 Tex Cr. 439, 258 S. W. 480 (1924).
"State v. Finch, 71 Kan. 793, 81 Pac. 494 (i9o5). Cf. State v. Lawrence,
38 Iowa 51 (1873).
'In Miller v. Miller, 187 Pa. 572, 41 Atl. 277 (1898), the foreman voluntarily stated the ratio of division. The court then urged the jury to agree,
in a manner which, it was held on appeal, did coerce the jury. But the Supreme
Court made no reference to the fact that the court knew how the jury stood.
'Commonwealth v. Tenbroeck, 265 Pa 251, io8 Ati. 635 (1919). After
the jury had been out 48 hours, the court said, "You must agree . . . as long
as you are physically able to remain, it is your duty to agree." This was held
not to be reversible error. See also Commonwealth v. Martin, 34 Pa. Super.
436 (1907).
73 BL. COM. *376; PROFFATT, TRIAL BY JURY (1877) § 475 et seq. See
King v. Ledingham, I Vent. 97 (1671); Anonymous, Y. B. 4 Ed. II, IV SEt.DON SOCIETY Y. B. SERIES 188 (1310).

